{"case_name":"A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras","neutral_citation":"1950 INSC 14","parallel_citations":{"scc":"AIR 1950 SC 27","air":"AIR 1950 SC 27","scr":"[1950] 1 SCR 88","manu":"MANU/SC/0012/1950"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"6-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["6-Judge Constitution Bench — H.J. Kania, C.J.I., Fazl Ali, Patanjali Sastri, Mehr Chand Mahajan, B.K. Mukherjea, S.R. Das, JJ."],"decision_date":"1950-05-19","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"A law depriving personal liberty satisfies Article 21 if it is passed by a competent legislature and follows prescribed statutory procedure. (Note: Substantive due process was subsequently incorporated into Art. 21 in Maneka Gandhi).","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative (Overruled). Majority held Article 21 only required law enacted by legislature; Fazl Ali, J. dissented (later adopted in Maneka Gandhi).","pinpoint":"[Paras 18–22]"}],"treatment_status":"OVERRULED","treatment_notes":"Overruled in Maneka Gandhi (1978)","overruling_reference":"Overruled on Article 21 scope by 7-Judge Bench","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=1950/english/1950_1_594_605_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala & Anr.","neutral_citation":"1973 INSC 225","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(1973) 4 SCC 225","air":"AIR 1973 SC 1461","scr":"[1973] Supp SCR 1","manu":"MANU/SC/0445/1973"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"13-Judge Special Constitution Bench","judges":["13-Judge Special Bench — S.M. Sikri, C.J.I., J.M. Shelat, K.S. Hegde, A.N. Grover, A.N. Ray, P. Jaganmohan Reddy, D.G. Palekar, H.R. Khanna, K.K. Mathew, M.H. Beg, S.N. Dwivedi, A.K. Mukherjea, Y.V. Chandrachud, JJ."],"decision_date":"1973-04-24","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The power of amendment under Article 368 is subject to the implied limitation that the basic structure of the Constitution cannot be destroyed. Supremacy of the Constitution, republican and democratic form of government, secularism, separation of powers, and judicial review constitute inviolable core features.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative as to limitation. Article 368 does not enable Parliament to alter the basic structure or framework of the Constitution.","pinpoint":"[Paras 1426, 1444, 2137]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Basic Structure Anchor","overruling_reference":"Highest Bench Strength in Indian Legal History (13-Judge)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=1973/english/1974_2_555_561_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Anr.","neutral_citation":"1978 INSC 248","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(1978) 1 SCC 248","air":"AIR 1978 SC 597","scr":"[1978] 2 SCR 621","manu":"MANU/SC/0133/1978"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"7-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["7-Judge Constitution Bench — M.H. Beg, C.J.I., Y.V. Chandrachud, P.N. Bhagwati, V.R. Krishna Iyer, N.L. Untwalia, S. Murtaza Fazal Ali, P.S. Kailasam, JJ."],"decision_date":"1978-01-25","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The procedure prescribed by law for depriving a person of life or personal liberty must be right, just, and fair and not arbitrary, fanciful or oppressive; otherwise, it would be no procedure at all and the requirement of Article 21 would not be satisfied.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. Procedure established by law in Article 21 must stand the test of non-arbitrariness under Article 14 and reasonableness under Article 19.","pinpoint":"[Paras 5–7]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Golden Triangle","overruling_reference":"Binding 7-Judge precedent on Art. 14, 19, 21 synthesis","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=1978/english/1979_2_442_457_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Indra Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"1992 INSC 268","parallel_citations":{"scc":"1992 Supp (3) SCC 217","air":"AIR 1993 SC 477","scr":"[1992] Supp 2 SCR 454","manu":"MANU/SC/0177/1993"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"9-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["9-Judge Constitution Bench — M.H. Kania, C.J.I., M.N. Venkatachaliah, S. Ratnavel Pandian, T.K. Thommen, A.M. Ahmadi, K.N. Singh, P.B. Sawant, R.M. Sahai, B.P. Jeevan Reddy, JJ."],"decision_date":"1992-11-16","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"Reservations contemplated under Article 16(4) should not exceed 50% of available seats in a single recruitment year, and the creamy layer must be strictly excluded from the benefits of affirmative action.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative as to backward class identification; negative as to breaching 50% cap save in extraordinary situations.","pinpoint":"[Paras 809–812]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Reservation Ceiling","overruling_reference":"Binding 9-Judge Benchmark on Article 16(4)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=1992/english/S_1992_1_904_915_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors.","neutral_citation":"1997 INSC 675","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(1997) 6 SCC 241","air":"AIR 1997 SC 3011","scr":"[1997] Supp 3 SCR 117","manu":"MANU/SC/0786/1997"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["Hon'ble J.S. Verma, C.J.I., Sujata V. Manohar, B.N. Kirpal, JJ."],"decision_date":"1997-08-13","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"Each incident of sexual harassment results in violation of fundamental rights of gender equality and the right to life and liberty under Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21. Employers must maintain internal complaints committees with female presiding officers.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. In the absence of legislative enactments, international conventions consistent with fundamental rights have binding domestic application.","pinpoint":"[Paras 16–18]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Statutory Adoption (POSH Act)","overruling_reference":"Binding Guidelines under Art. 32 & 141","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=1997/english/S_1997_4_311_319_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"T.M.A. Pai Foundation & Ors. v. State of Karnataka & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2002 INSC 446","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2002) 8 SCC 481","air":"AIR 2003 SC 355","scr":"[2002] Supp 3 SCR 587","manu":"MANU/SC/0907/2002"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"11-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["11-Judge Constitution Bench — B.N. Kirpal, C.J.I., G.B. Pattanaik, V.N. Khare, S. Rajendra Babu, S.S.M. Quadri, Ruma Pal, S.N. Variava, K.G. Balakrishnan, P. Venkatarama Reddi, Ashok Bhan, Arijit Pasayat, JJ."],"decision_date":"2002-10-31","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The right to establish and administer educational institutions is guaranteed under Article 19(1)(g) and Article 30. The State has no power to fix quotas in private unaided institutions, though profiteering and capitation fee can be prohibited.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative as to quota imposition; affirmative only as to maintaining merit and preventing capitation fees.","pinpoint":"[Paras 50–54]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Minority Institutions","overruling_reference":"Binding 11-Judge benchmark on Article 30 and Unaided Institutions","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2002/english/S_2002_3_473_490_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Bhatia International v. Bulk Trading S.A. & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2002 INSC 131","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2002) 4 SCC 105","air":"AIR 2002 SC 1432","scr":"[2002] 2 SCR 368","manu":"MANU/SC/0185/2002"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["Hon'ble N. Santosh Hegde, K.G. Balakrishnan, B.P. Singh, JJ."],"decision_date":"2002-03-13","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"Part I of the 1996 Act applies to all arbitrations, even if seated outside India, unless expressly or impliedly excluded by the parties. Overruled prospectively from 06.09.2012 by BALCO (5-Judge Bench).","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative (Overruled). Part I applies unless expressly or impliedly excluded. (Overruled by BALCO).","pinpoint":"[Paras 32–34]"}],"treatment_status":"OVERRULED","treatment_notes":"Overruled in BALCO (2012)","overruling_reference":"Overruled by 5-Judge Constitution Bench in 2012 INSC 394","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2002/english/2002_2_346_359_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Smt. Selvi & Ors. v. State of Karnataka","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 299","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 7 SCC 263","air":"AIR 2010 SC 1974","scr":"[2010] 7 SCR 363","manu":"MANU/SC/0325/2010"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["3-Judge Bench — K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I., R.V. Raveendran, J.M. Panchal, JJ."],"decision_date":"2010-05-05","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"We hold that no individual should be forcibly subjected to any of the techniques in question, whether in the context of investigation in criminal cases or otherwise. Doing so would amount to an unwarranted intrusion into personal liberty and mental privacy under Article 21, and the answers extracted forcibly are barred by Article 20(3) against self-incrimination.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. Compulsory administration of such techniques constitutes \"testimonial compulsion\" and infringes bodily integrity and mental privacy under Article 21.","pinpoint":"[Paras 221–225]"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Negative as to statements; physical discoveries made on voluntary disclosures alone can be admitted with strict safeguards.","pinpoint":"[Paras 263–265]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Article 20(3) Self-Incrimination & Privacy","overruling_reference":"Affirmed by 9-Judge Bench in Puttaswamy (2017)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2010/english/2010_6_657_697_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"S. Anirudh v. State (NCT of Delhi)","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 445","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 9 SCC 712","air":"AIR 2010 SC 3201","scr":"[2010] 10 SCR 481","manu":"MANU/SC/0612/2010"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Harjit Singh Bedi, J.M. Panchal, JJ."],"decision_date":"2010-08-09","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The basic requirement of Section 120-A/120-B is the meeting of minds to do an illegal act. While direct evidence of conspiracy is rarely available, circumstantial inferences must unerringly point to guilt and cannot rest on surmise or frequent phone calls without proof of conversation substance.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative. The prosecution must establish agreement to commit the unlawful act by unbroken circumstantial chain excluding every hypothesis of innocence.","pinpoint":"[Paras 14–17]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Criminal Conspiracy & Circumstantial Evidence","overruling_reference":"Reiterated in Sharad Birdhichand Chain","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2010/english/2010_9_205_210_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"M.C. Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. (Taj Trapezium Zone)","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 512","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 11 SCC 344","air":"AIR 2011 SC 480","scr":"[2010] 12 SCR 892","manu":"MANU/SC/0781/2010"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble K.S. Radhakrishnan, C.K. Prasad, JJ."],"decision_date":"2010-09-21","subject":"environmental","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The statutory authorities must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental degradation. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage to world heritage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent decay.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative. Sustainable development mandates absolute preservation of heritage monuments over commercial expansion.","pinpoint":"[Paras 28–30]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Environmental Precautionary Principle","overruling_reference":"Reaffirms 1996 Taj Trapezium Constitution directives","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2010/english/2010_9_1168_1188_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Rajesh Kumar & Ors. v. State through CBI","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 601","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 12 SCC 488","air":"AIR 2011 SC 802","scr":"[2010] 13 SCR 1120","manu":"MANU/SC/0890/2010"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble V.S. Sirpurkar, Cyriac Joseph, JJ."],"decision_date":"2010-10-19","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The order of sanction must demonstrate that the sanctioning authority applied its mind to the relevant material placed before it. When the order reveals mechanical reproduction of the CBI report without objective assessment, trial conviction cannot stand.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. Grant of sanction is not an idle formality; mechanical signature on draft sanctions prepared by CBI violates Section 19.","pinpoint":"[Paras 18–21]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Prevention of Corruption Act Sanction","overruling_reference":"Article 141 Binding Guidance on PC Act §19","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2010/english/2010_11_627_647_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Virender Ghag & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 152","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 4 SCC 603","air":"AIR 2010 SC 1512","scr":"[2010] 3 SCR 85","manu":"MANU/SC/0154/2010"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Markandey Katju, T.S. Thakur, JJ."],"decision_date":"2010-02-18","subject":"service","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The rules of selection cannot be altered after the selection process has commenced unless the advertisement or rules expressly reserve such power. Changing criteria midway violates legitimate expectation and Article 14 fairness.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative. Introducing new thresholds midway without statutory backing constitutes arbitrary administrative action.","pinpoint":"[Paras 11–13]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Public Employment Article 14 & 16","overruling_reference":"Reiterated in K. Manjusree v. State of A.P.","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2010/english/2010_3_450_459_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Bharat Aluminium Co. (BALCO) v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc.","neutral_citation":"2012 INSC 394","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2012) 9 SCC 552","air":"AIR 2013 SC 199","scr":"[2012] 8 SCR 597","manu":"MANU/SC/0722/2012"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"5-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.H. Kapadia (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice D.K. Jain","Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.S. Nijjar","Hon'ble Ms. Justice Ranjana Prakash Desai","Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar"],"decision_date":"2012-09-06","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":["Arbitration Act Section 2(2)","Part I","Part II","Section 9"],"ratio_decidendi":"Part I of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 applies only to domestic arbitrations seated in India. Indian courts have no jurisdiction to entertain interim applications under Section 9 or set-aside applications under Section 34 for foreign-seated arbitrations. Overruled Bhatia International (2002).","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Seat of arbitration confers exclusive supervisory jurisdiction on the courts of the seat.","pinpoint":"Paras 96–100"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Part I and Part II of the Act are mutually exclusive; no concurrent jurisdiction exists.","pinpoint":"Paras 143–155"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Cornerstone 5-Judge Constitution Bench ruling establishing India's modern territorial arbitration regime.","overruling_reference":"Expressly Overruled Bhatia International (2002)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2012/english/2012_12_315_326_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Lalita Kumari v. Government of U.P. & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2013 INSC 768","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2014) 2 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2014 SC 187","scr":"[2014] 1 SCR 986","manu":"MANU/SC/0768/2013"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"5-Judge Constitution Bench (Unanimous)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice P. Sathasivam (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.S. Chauhan","Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.K. Sikri","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Ranjan Gogoi","Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.Y. Eqbal"],"decision_date":"2013-11-12","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":["CrPC Section 154 (BNSS 2023 §175)","Section 156 (BNSS 2023 §177)","Section 157 (BNSS 2023 §178)","Constitution of India Article 21"],"ratio_decidendi":"Registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offense, and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such situations. Preliminary inquiry permitted only in specified categories (medical negligence, matrimonial disputes, commercial corruption) and must be concluded within 7 days.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Mandatory registration of FIR for cognizable disclosures without preliminary inquiry.","pinpoint":"Paras 119–120"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"The canonical Constitution Bench authority on police obligation under Section 154.","overruling_reference":"Binding on <= 3 Judges","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2013/english/2013_12_596_606_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2014 INSC 492","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2014) 8 SCC 273","air":"AIR 2014 SC 2756","scr":"[2014] 9 SCR 57","manu":"MANU/SC/0492/2014"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice Chandramauli Kumar Prasad","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Pinaki Chandra Ghose"],"decision_date":"2014-07-02","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":["CrPC Section 41 (BNSS 2023 §41)","Section 41A (BNSS 2023 §35A)","Section 57 (BNSS 2023 §57)","Section 167 (BNSS 2023 §187)","IPC Section 498A (BNS 2023 §85)"],"ratio_decidendi":"Police officers cannot automatically arrest accused in offenses punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. Police must satisfy conditions under Section 41 CrPC and issue notice of appearance under Section 41A before resorting to arrest. Magistrates must record independent satisfaction before authorizing detention under Section 167.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Mandatory issuance of Notice of Appearance under Section 41A CrPC within two weeks of case institution.","pinpoint":"Paras 11–13"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Failure to comply attracts departmental disciplinary action against IO and contempt of court proceedings.","pinpoint":"Para 14"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Reiterated in Satender Kumar Antil (2022). Applies equally under BNSS 2023.","overruling_reference":"Affirmed and reiterated in Satender Kumar Antil (2022) 10 SCC 51","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2014/english/2014_8_890_908_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2014 INSC 587","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2014) 9 SCC 129","air":"AIR 2014 SC 3519","scr":"[2014] 10 SCR 368","manu":"MANU/SC/0655/2014"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["Hon'ble T.S. Thakur, Vikramajit Sen, C. Nagappan, JJ."],"decision_date":"2014-08-01","subject":"Commercial Litigation","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"Territorial jurisdiction is restricted to the court within whose local jurisdiction the offence was committed, which is the place where the cheque is dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn. (Superseded by 2015 NI Amendment §142(2)).","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Statutorily Superseded. Held jurisdiction was at place of dishonor; Parliament superseded this by 2015 amendment placing jurisdiction at payee bank.","pinpoint":"[Paras 17–19]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Statutorily Superseded (NI Act Amendment 2015)","overruling_reference":"Superseded by Parliament inserting Section 142(2) NI Act","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2014/english/2014_14_364_392_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2017 INSC 1001","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2017) 10 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2017 SC 4161","scr":"[2017] 10 SCR 569","manu":"MANU/SC/1023/2017"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"9-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["9-Judge Constitution Bench — J.S. Khehar, C.J.I., J. Chelameswar, S.A. Bobde, R.K. Agrawal, R.F. Nariman, A.M. Sapre, D.Y. Chandrachud, S.K. Kaul, S. Abdul Nazeer, JJ."],"decision_date":"2017-08-24","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and as a part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. Decisions in M.P. Sharma and Kharak Singh are overruled to that extent.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative as to privacy; negative as to preclusion. Privacy is an intrinsic element of Article 21 and the freedoms guaranteed by Part III.","pinpoint":"[Paras 297–300, 320]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Article 21 Privacy Anchor","overruling_reference":"Unanimous 9-Judge Benchmark overruling MP Sharma & ADM Jabalpur","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2017/english/2017_11_893_898_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2017 INSC 1146","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2018) 11 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2017 SC 5500","scr":"[2017] 13 SCR 959","manu":"MANU/SC/1480/2017"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Rohinton Fali Nariman, Sanjay Kishan Kaul, JJ."],"decision_date":"2017-11-23","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"Section 45(1) as it stood turned the presumption of innocence on its head and discriminated between persons accused of the same offence depending on whether PMLA was invoked. It violated Articles 14 and 21.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. Struck down the provision as drastically unconstitutional; Parliament subsequently amended the section in 2018.","pinpoint":"[Paras 42–46]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Partially Re-enacted / PMLA §45 Strict Standards","overruling_reference":"Re-visited in Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (2022)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2017/english/2017_11_164_178_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Swiss Ribbons Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2019 INSC 83","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2019) 4 SCC 17","air":"AIR 2019 SC 739","scr":"[2019] 3 SCR 535","manu":"MANU/SC/0079/2019"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Navin Sinha"],"decision_date":"2019-01-25","subject":"Insolvency & Bankruptcy (IBC)","sections_interpreted":["IBC Section 7","IBC Section 9","IBC Section 12A","IBC Section 29A"],"ratio_decidendi":"The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is a beneficial legislation aimed at resolution, revival, and maximizing value of corporate debtors, not recovery. The classification between financial and operational creditors is founded on an intelligible differentia and does not violate Article 14.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Distinction between Financial and Operational Creditors under the Code is constitutional and reasonable.","pinpoint":"Paras 27–34"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Withdrawal of CIRP under Section 12A requires ninety percent voting share of Committee of Creditors and NCLT approval.","pinpoint":"Paras 52–54"},{"point":3,"proposition":"Section 29A disqualification of related parties must be construed purposively to prevent defaulting promoters from backdoor re-entry.","pinpoint":"Paras 65–71"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Affirmed by Constitution Bench in subsequent insolvency jurisprudence.","overruling_reference":"Reiterated in Essar Steel (2019)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2019/english/2019_2_493_506_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2019 INSC 1258","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2020) 8 SCC 531","air":"AIR 2020 SC 480","scr":"[2019] 16 SCR 275","manu":"MANU/SC/1577/2019"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Rohinton Fali Nariman, Surya Kant, V. Ramasubramanian, JJ."],"decision_date":"2019-11-15","subject":"Commercial Litigation","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The Adjudicating Authority cannot interfere with the commercial wisdom of the CoC unless the plan violates Section 30(2). Equitable treatment does not mean equal treatment among creditors of different classes.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Negative. The commercial wisdom of the CoC has supreme primacy; judicial review is confined within Section 30(2) boundaries.","pinpoint":"[Paras 65–68]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / CoC Commercial Wisdom Primacy","overruling_reference":"Binding 3-Judge precedent on IBC Resolution","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2019/english/2019_16_275_423_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Vidya Drolia and Others v. Durga Trading Corporation","neutral_citation":"2020 INSC 697","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2021) 2 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2021 SC 79","scr":"[2020] 12 SCR 1056","manu":"MANU/SC/0939/2020"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Full Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice N.V. Ramana","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Krishna Murari"],"decision_date":"2020-12-14","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":["Arbitration & Conciliation Act Section 8","Section 11","Section 34","Transfer of Property Act Section 111"],"ratio_decidendi":"Landlord-tenant disputes governed by the Transfer of Property Act are arbitrable unless governed by special rent control legislation conferring exclusive jurisdiction on specialized forums. Laid down fourfold test of non-arbitrability.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Fourfold test for non-arbitrability: disputes involving rights in rem, third-party rights, public interest, or exclusive statutory courts are non-arbitrable.","pinpoint":"Paras 76–84"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Judicial review at Section 11 stage is limited to preliminary verification and confined to examining the existence of arbitration agreement ('when in doubt, refer').","pinpoint":"Paras 130–134"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Settled three-decade controversy on tenant-landlord arbitrability.","overruling_reference":"Harmonised in NN Global 7-Judge (2023)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2020/english/2020_11_1001_1180_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"In Re: Interplay between Arbitration Agreements under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 and the Indian Stamp Act 1899","neutral_citation":"2023 INSC 1066","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2024) 6 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2024 SC 1","scr":"[2023] 16 SCR 1","manu":"MANU/SC/1334/2023"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"7-Judge Constitution Bench (Unanimous)","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.K. Kaul","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna","Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant","Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra"],"decision_date":"2023-12-13","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":["Arbitration Act Section 11(6A)","Section 8","Indian Stamp Act Section 33","Section 35"],"ratio_decidendi":"Non-stamping or insufficient stamping of an underlying commercial contract does not render the arbitration clause void ab initio. The defect of stamping is curable, and objections relating to stamping fall squarely within the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal under Section 16, not the referral court under Section 11.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Overruled NN Global Mercantile (5-Judge) and SMS Tea Estates; established modern pro-arbitration doctrine for India.","pinpoint":"Paras 112–118"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Referral court under Section 11 must examine existence of agreement on preliminary verification; impounding at referral stage causes commercial delays contrary to Act.","pinpoint":"Paras 145–150"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Overruled 5-Judge Bench in NN Global (2023). Highest authority on stamping in arbitration.","overruling_reference":"Overruled 5-Judge NN Global Bench (2023)","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2023/english/2023_15_1081_1212_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Association for Democratic Reforms & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2024 INSC 113","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2024) 5 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2024 SC 1441","scr":"[2024] 2 SCR 1","manu":"MANU/SC/0111/2024"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"5-Judge Constitution Bench","judges":["5-Judge Constitution Bench — D.Y. Chandrachud, C.J.I., Sanjiv Khanna, B.R. Gavai, J.B. Pardiwala, Manoj Misra, JJ."],"decision_date":"2024-02-15","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"The right to information of voters under Article 19(1)(a) extends to information regarding financial contributions made to political parties, as money plays an influential role in electoral politics and policy formulation. The anonymity shield is unconstitutional.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative. The scheme fails the proportionality test; information about political party funding is essential for electoral democracy.","pinpoint":"[Paras 219–223]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Right to Information & Political Transparency","overruling_reference":"Unanimous 5-Judge Constitution Ruling","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2024/english/2024_2_420_616_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Yerram Vijay Kumar v. State of Telangana","neutral_citation":"2026 INSC 42","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2026) 1 SCC 100","air":"AIR 2026 SC 88","scr":"[2026] 1 SCR 140","manu":"MANU/SC/0042/2026"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Bench","judges":["3-Judge Bench — Surya Kant, J.B. Pardiwala, Ujjal Bhuyan, JJ."],"decision_date":"2026-01-15","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":[],"ratio_decidendi":"To ensure authenticity under Section 63 BSA, 2023, every digital recording or cloud-extracted artifact must be certified with its SHA-256 hash value at the point of seizure, accompanied by a verified certificate by the device or platform custodian.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Affirmative as to cryptographic verification. Cloud and ephemeral records require SHA-256 cryptographic hashes and custodian metadata certificates.","pinpoint":"[Paras 18–22]"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Good Law / Section 63 BSA Electronic Evidence","overruling_reference":"Interprets Section 63 Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023","official_source":"https://indian-supreme-court-judgments.s3.amazonaws.com/data/pdf/year=2026/english/2026_1_439_466_EN.pdf","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Ltd. v. Satish Kumar Gupta & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2019 INSC 1242","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2020) 8 SCC 531"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Full Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant","Hon'ble Mr. Justice V. Ramasubramanian"],"decision_date":"2019-11-15","subject":"Insolvency & Bankruptcy (IBC)","sections_interpreted":["IBC Section 30(2)","IBC Section 31","IBC Section 53"],"ratio_decidendi":"The commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors (CoC) is non-justiciable. The Adjudicating Authority (NCLT) or Appellate Authority (NCLAT) cannot interfere on merits of business decisions or substitute its judgment for the CoC.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Commercial wisdom of the CoC prevails regarding distribution and viability of resolution plans.","pinpoint":"Paras 65–73"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Equality of treatment does not mean equal distribution; differential treatment between secured and unsecured creditors is legally permissible.","pinpoint":"Paras 88–92"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Foundational benchmark on limits of judicial review over CoC decisions.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2017 INSC 790","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2018) 1 SCC 407"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul"],"decision_date":"2017-08-31","subject":"Insolvency & Bankruptcy (IBC)","sections_interpreted":["IBC Section 7","IBC Section 8","IBC Section 9","Constitution of India Article 254"],"ratio_decidendi":"Under Section 7 of the IBC, the Adjudicating Authority only needs to ascertain the existence of a default. Once default is established, the application must be admitted; no defense of set-off or counter-claim is tenable.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Moment a financial debt of minimum threshold is due and unpaid, Section 7 admission is mandatory.","pinpoint":"Paras 27–30"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"First landmark interpretation of the IBC framework by the Supreme Court.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Cox and Kings Ltd. v. SAP India Pvt. Ltd. & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2023 INSC 1051","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2024) 4 SCC 1"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"5-Judge Constitution Bench (Unanimous)","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy","Hon'ble Mr. Justice P.S. Narasimha","Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra"],"decision_date":"2023-12-06","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":["Arbitration Act Section 2(1)(h)","Section 7","Section 8","Section 11"],"ratio_decidendi":"Upheld the Group of Companies Doctrine in Indian arbitration law with refined foundations grounded in party intent, mutual consent, and cumulative commercial factors rather than piercing the corporate veil.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Non-signatory corporate group affiliates may be bound if common intent to bind is demonstrated by substantial participation in negotiation, performance, or termination.","pinpoint":"Paras 120–135"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Modern cornerstone precedent on multi-party complex commercial arbitration.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Perkins Eastman Architects DPC & Anr. v. HSCC (India) Ltd.","neutral_citation":"2019 INSC 1297","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2020) 20 SCC 760"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice U.U. Lalit","Hon'ble Ms. Justice Indu Malhotra"],"decision_date":"2019-11-26","subject":"Arbitration","sections_interpreted":["Arbitration Act Section 11(6)","Section 12(5)","Seventh Schedule"],"ratio_decidendi":"A person who is ineligible to act as an arbitrator under Section 12(5) read with the Seventh Schedule cannot nominate or appoint a sole arbitrator. Unilateral arbitrator appointments by one interested contracting party are impermissible in law.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Ineligibility under Section 12(5) extends to the power to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator.","pinpoint":"Paras 20–29"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Landmark safeguard ensuring impartiality in domestic commercial contracts.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Satender Kumar Antil v. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr.","neutral_citation":"2022 INSC 690","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2022) 10 SCC 51","air":"AIR 2022 SC 3386"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul","Hon'ble Mr. Justice M.M. Sundresh"],"decision_date":"2022-07-11","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":["CrPC Section 88 (BNSS 2023 §78)","Section 170 (BNSS 2023 §189)","Section 204 (BNSS 2023 §232)","Section 436 (BNSS 2023 §479)","Section 437 (BNSS 2023 §480)","Section 438 (BNSS 2023 §482)","Section 439 (BNSS 2023 §483)"],"ratio_decidendi":"Laid down comprehensive nationwide guidelines for bail across four categorized offenses (Categories A, B, C, D). Reiterated that arrest is a draconian measure and bail is the rule while jail is the exception.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Category A offenses (punishable up to 7 years): ordinary summons without physical custody if accused cooperated during investigation.","pinpoint":"Paras 24–32"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Bail applications must be disposed of within two weeks, and anticipatory bail within six weeks.","pinpoint":"Para 100"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"National Standard for Magistrate and Sessions Courts in bail adjudication.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal","neutral_citation":"1996 INSC 1551","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(1997) 1 SCC 416","air":"AIR 1997 SC 610"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice A.S. Anand","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh"],"decision_date":"1996-12-18","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":["Constitution of India Article 21","Article 22","CrPC Section 50A (BNSS 2023 §57A)","Section 54 (BNSS 2023 §58)"],"ratio_decidendi":"Laid down mandatory 11-point requirements to be followed in all cases of arrest or detention to curb custodial violence and protect human dignity under Article 21.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Mandatory memo of arrest with accurate date, time, and witness signature; immediate notification of relative or friend within 8 to 12 hours.","pinpoint":"Paras 35–37"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Statutorily incorporated into Sections 50A, 54, and 55A of CrPC (and BNSS 2023).","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2017 INSC 777","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2017) 10 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2017 SC 4161","scr":"[2017] 10 SCR 569"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"9-Judge Constitution Bench (Unanimous)","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud","Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.S. Khehar (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar","Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.A. Bobde","Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman","Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Sapre","Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.K. Kaul","Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Banumathi","Hon'ble Mr. Justice S.A. Nazeer"],"decision_date":"2017-08-24","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":["Constitution of India Article 21","Article 14","Article 19"],"ratio_decidendi":"The right to privacy is an intrinsic part of the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 and a foundational freedom guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. M.P. Sharma (1954) and Kharak Singh (1962) overruled to the extent they held privacy is not a fundamental right.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Privacy is a fundamental right emanating from liberty, dignity, and autonomy.","pinpoint":"Paras 298–310"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Any State infringement on privacy must satisfy threefold proportionality test: legality, legitimate state aim, and proportionality.","pinpoint":"Paras 311–315"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Historic 9-Judge Constitution Bench precedent. Foundation of Indian DPDP Act.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"High Court Bar Association, Allahabad v. State of U.P. & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2024 INSC 150","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2024) 6 SCC 267"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"5-Judge Constitution Bench (Unanimous)","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud (CJI)","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna","Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra"],"decision_date":"2024-02-29","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":["Constitution of India Article 142","Article 226","Article 227"],"ratio_decidendi":"Overruled Asian Resurfacing (2018). Supreme Court cannot direct that interim stay orders granted by High Courts will automatically vacate after six months unless extended. Constitutional courts should not fix time-bound schedules for disposal of cases by High Courts.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Automatic vacation of interim stay orders violates judicial discretion under Article 226 and causes prejudice to litigants without fault.","pinpoint":"Paras 28–34"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Major relief for High Court writ and civil practitioners across India.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Shreya Singhal v. Union of India","neutral_citation":"2015 INSC 244","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2015) 5 SCC 1","air":"AIR 2015 SC 1523"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice J. Chelameswar","Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman"],"decision_date":"2015-03-24","subject":"Constitutional Law","sections_interpreted":["Information Technology Act Section 66A","Section 79","Constitution of India Article 19(1)(a)","Article 19(2)"],"ratio_decidendi":"Section 66A of the Information Technology Act, 2000 struck down in its entirety as unconstitutional for being vague, overbroad, and violating freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a). Clear distinction drawn between discussion, advocacy, and incitement.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Advocacy or discussion cannot be criminalized unless it reaches the threshold of incitement.","pinpoint":"Paras 13–21"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Intermediary safe harbor under Section 79 clarified: takedowns require a court order or government directive.","pinpoint":"Paras 116–124"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Cornerstone freedom of speech precedent in digital communication.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Celir LLP v. Bafna Motors (Mumbai) Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2023 INSC 838","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2024) 2 SCC 1"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice J.B. Pardiwala","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Manoj Misra"],"decision_date":"2023-09-21","subject":"Commercial Litigation","sections_interpreted":["SARFAESI Act Section 13(8)","Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules Rule 8","Rule 9"],"ratio_decidendi":"Under amended Section 13(8) of the SARFAESI Act, 2002, the borrower's right of redemption extinguishes on the date of publication of the public auction notice. High Courts under Article 226 cannot permit redemption after auction publication to the detriment of bona fide auction purchasers.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Borrower cannot defeat public auction by offering settlement after publication of auction notice.","pinpoint":"Paras 85–97"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Critical ruling protecting banking recovery and sanctity of public auctions.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Union of India & Anr. v. Mohit Minerals Pvt. Ltd.","neutral_citation":"2022 INSC 590","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2022) 10 SCC 700"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Full Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Surya Kant","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Vikram Nath"],"decision_date":"2022-05-19","subject":"Taxation","sections_interpreted":["IGST Act Section 5(3)","Section 5(4)","CGST Act","Constitution of India Article 246A","Article 279A"],"ratio_decidendi":"Recommendations of the GST Council are not binding on Parliament and State Legislatures; they possess only persuasive value. Struck down IGST levy on ocean freight in CIF contracts as an impermissible tax on supply already subjected to customs duty.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"GST Council acts as a forum of cooperative federalism; statutory recommendations are persuasive rather than peremptory.","pinpoint":"Paras 51–64"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Separate IGST on ocean freight paid by foreign supplier in CIF import contracts is unconstitutional.","pinpoint":"Paras 140–148"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Landmark tax jurisprudence clarifying the constitutional balance of fiscal federalism.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Ghanashyam Mishra & Sons Pvt. Ltd. v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd.","neutral_citation":"2021 INSC 250","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2021) 9 SCC 657"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Full Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.F. Nariman","Hon'ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy"],"decision_date":"2021-04-13","subject":"Insolvency & Bankruptcy (IBC)","sections_interpreted":["IBC Section 31(1)","IBC Section 238","Central Excise Act","Income Tax Act"],"ratio_decidendi":"The 'Clean Slate Doctrine' under Section 31(1) of the IBC is absolute. Once a resolution plan is approved by the Adjudicating Authority (NCLT), all claims that were not part of the resolution plan stand extinguished permanently. No statutory authority (including tax authorities) can initiate or continue recovery for pre-CIRP claims.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Approval of resolution plan results in clean slate; all past unincluded claims, dues, and statutory levies stand extinguished.","pinpoint":"Paras 95–102"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Foundational protection for resolution applicants against unexpected historic liabilities.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"Anuj Jain, Interim Resolution Professional for Jaypee Infratech Ltd. v. Axis Bank Ltd. & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2020 INSC 244","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2020) 8 SCC 401"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.M. Khanwilkar","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Dinesh Maheshwari"],"decision_date":"2020-02-26","subject":"Insolvency & Bankruptcy (IBC)","sections_interpreted":["IBC Section 5(8)","IBC Section 43","IBC Section 45","IBC Section 66"],"ratio_decidendi":"Mortgages created by a corporate debtor over its assets to secure loans of its parent company or third parties without direct financial disbursement to the debtor do not make the mortgagee a 'Financial Creditor' under Section 5(8). Mortgages created within the look-back period are avoidable as preferential transactions under Section 43.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Third-party mortgagees are not financial creditors of the mortgagor under IBC.","pinpoint":"Paras 46–52"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Look-back period and twin conditions for avoidance of preferential transactions under Section 43.","pinpoint":"Paras 20–25"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Highest authority on avoidance of preferential security interests and limits of financial creditor status.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"United Bank of India v. Satyawati Tondon & Ors.","neutral_citation":"2010 INSC 516","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2010) 8 SCC 110","air":"AIR 2010 SC 3413"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"Division Bench (2 Judges)","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice G.S. Singhvi","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Asok Kumar Ganguly"],"decision_date":"2010-07-26","subject":"Commercial Litigation","sections_interpreted":["SARFAESI Act Section 13(4)","Section 17","Constitution of India Article 226"],"ratio_decidendi":"High Courts should exercise extreme restraint and refrain from entertaining writ petitions under Article 226 against bank recovery measures under Section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act, since an efficacious and comprehensive statutory remedy of appeal is available before the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) under Section 17.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be used as an alternative to statutory appeal before the DRT in SARFAESI matters.","pinpoint":"Paras 42–46"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"The leading precedent cited daily by banks and financial institutions against interim writ stays.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}
{"case_name":"P. Chidambaram v. Directorate of Enforcement","neutral_citation":"2019 INSC 1318","parallel_citations":{"scc":"(2020) 13 SCC 791","air":"AIR 2020 SC 169"},"court":"Supreme Court of India","bench":"3-Judge Full Bench","judges":["Hon'ble Mr. Justice R. Banumathi","Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.S. Bopanna","Hon'ble Mr. Justice Hrishikesh Roy"],"decision_date":"2019-12-04","subject":"Criminal & Bail","sections_interpreted":["CrPC Section 439 (BNSS 2023 §483)","PMLA Section 45 (as amended by PMLA (Amendment) Act, 2023 — bail restriction now read with BNS 2023 §81)","Constitution of India Article 21"],"ratio_decidendi":"Even in economic offenses, bail cannot be denied solely on the gravity of the allegations as a pre-trial punishment. The basic triple test for regular bail must be satisfied: flight risk, risk of tampering with evidence, and likelihood of influencing witnesses. Courts cannot rely on sealed cover documents to deny bail without disclosing them to the accused.","headnotes":[{"point":1,"proposition":"Gravity of offense alone without flight risk or tampering risk does not justify denial of bail.","pinpoint":"Paras 21–24"},{"point":2,"proposition":"Reliance on sealed cover findings by prosecution to deny bail infringes fair trial principles.","pinpoint":"Paras 33–35"}],"treatment_status":"CURRENT_LAW","treatment_notes":"Landmark authority frequently cited in economic offense and PMLA bail hearings.","overruling_reference":"","official_source":"https://www.sci.gov.in","source":"insc.one"}